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aBstract
We argue that genuine modal realism can be ex-
tended, rather than modified, so as to allow for 
the possibility of nothing concrete, a possibility 
we term ‘metaphysical nihilism’.  The issue should 
be important to the genuine modal realist be-
cause, not only is metaphysical nihilism itself in-
tuitively plausible, but also it is supported by an 
argument with pre-theoretically credible prem-
ises, namely, the subtraction argument.  Given 
the soundness of the subtraction argument, we 
show that there are two ways that the genuine 
modal realist can accommodate metaphysical 
nihilism: (i) by allowing for worlds containing 
only spatiotemporal points and (ii) by allowing 
for a world containing nothing but the null indi-
vidual.   on methodological grounds, we argue 
that the genuine modal realist should reject the 
former way but embrace the latter way. 
Key words: modal realism, substraction argu-
ment, metaphysical nihilism
We should distinguish two aspects of modal theorizing. first, one 
might give a metaphysics of unactualized 
possibility, i.e. a theory of what kinds of 
things possible worlds are. second, one 
might give a theory of what kind of situ-
ation is and is not possible, i.e. a theory 
of what possible worlds there are. Genu-
ine modal realism (GMr) (lewis 1986b) 
is an example of the first sort of theory.1 
it maintains that there is a plurality of 
possible worlds each of which is an indi-
vidual of the same ontological kind as the 
1  Many, if not most, commentators (e.g. Divers 2002, 
p. 46) take GMr to include not only a theory of what 
possible worlds are, but also a theory of what possible 
worlds there are by including in GMr the principle 
of recombination, roughly (and metaphorically), the 
claim that one can ‘patch together’ parts of possible 
worlds to form other possible worlds (lewis 1986b, p. 
87).  The principle of recombination is an inflationary 
principle allowing one to infer from some possibilities 
to the existence of others, and as such it is not a part 
of the metaphysical theory of what a possibility is. The 
confusion arises in the following way: GMr analyses 
modal claims as existential claims about worlds.  Thus 
there can be no sense to the claim that the existence of 
a particular possible world is a contingent matter.  This 
thought is sometimes inaccurately expressed as ‘every 
possible world that might exist does exist’, which looks 
like the principle of plenitude, and lewis replaces that 
with the principle of recombination.
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actual world, namely, a maximally spatiotemporally interrelated mereological sum of 
things, and every world is causally and spatiotemporally isolated from all other worlds. 
if GMr is true, it places a constraint on claims about what possibilities there are: for 
any proposition p, it is possible that p only if there is a GMr-possible world in which 
p is true. one might call this claim ‘the GMr constraint on possibility’. for example, 
according to GMr, there is no possible world containing a pair of spatially and tempo-
rally unrelated objects, so it is not possible that there are island universes, i.e. spatially 
and temporally unrelated regions.2 lewis acknowledges and accepts this consequence, 
noting that the possibility of island universes does not seem to follow from ‘any in-
teresting general principle about what is possible’ (lewis 1986b, p. 71). Thus, GMr is 
a thesis about what unactualized possibilities are, it has some consequences for what 
possibilities there are, but these consequences are only problematic if they conflict with 
some attractive theoretical principle about the latter.
our problem is this: if a possible world is a maximally spatiotemporally interrelated 
mereological sum of things, then it seems that there is no null world, no possible 
world consisting of absolutely no spatiotemporally located things. and if that is 
so, then GMr rules out the possibility of there being no spatiotemporally located 
things. put another way, it seems that the possibility of there being nothing, i.e. 
there being no spatiotemporally located things at all, falls foul of the GMr con-
straint on possibility, for it seems that the null world is not a GMr-possible world.
now if all spatiotemporal things are concrete,3 GMr seems to require that there 
had to have been at least one concrete object, ruling out the empty world4 of no 
concrete objects. But the claim that there might have been nothing concrete, a 
claim lowe (lowe 2002) has called ‘metaphysical nihilism’, embodies a fairly secure 
modal intuition, and more importantly, it is entailed by an interesting and intuitive 
general principle in the theory of what is possible. so any view that denies meta-
physical nihilism would run counter to both intuition and theory. in this paper, we 
argue that GMr need not incur this cost, in contrast to lewis’s (lewis 1986b, p. 73) 
claims to the contrary. We show that there are two ways of extending, rather than 
modifying,5 GMr which show how it is consistent with metaphysical nihilism. so 
2  according to GMr there are pairs of spatiotemporally unrelated objects existing at different possible worlds, but 
not within a world.  since possibility is analysed as truth at a world, island universes are impossible.  however, the 
non-modal claim, using unrestricted quantifiers, ‘There are spatiotemporally unrelated objects’ is true.
3  Just what ‘concrete’ means we explain below.
4  We define a ‘null world’ as one with no spatiotemporally located objects and an ‘empty world’ as one with no 
concrete objects.  for ease of exposition we assume that there is at most one of each.  as will become clear below, 
someone might think that the null world is empty but the empty world is not null.
5  Bricker 2001 and  rodriguez-pereyra 2004 take the alternative strategy of modifying GMr in order to make it 
consistent with metaphysical nihilism.  if our argument in this paper is correct, that strategy is unnecessary.  it 
may, however, be the case that a modified GMr is a more plausible theory of what possible worlds are than lewis’s 
version, which would give one a reason to favour Bricker’s or rodriguez-pereyra’s strategy.  in this paper we intend 
to remain entirely neutral on the merits of GMr as a theory of modality.
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after all, GMr alone does not rule out the empty world. furthermore, one of these 
extensions even countenances the null world of no spatiotemporally related ob-
jects. Thus, despite appearances, the GMr constraint on possibility does not even 
rule out the null world. But both ways of extending GMr incur further metaphysi-
cal costs, which we elaborate. We tentatively conclude that the costs incurred by 
the extension which allows the empty world is also the null world are lighter than 
those incurred by the other extension to GMr, so for methodological reasons it 
is to be preferred. consequently, the genuine modal realist can, and should, be a 
metaphysical nihilist.
The argument we give is also intended to be an illustration of good practice in the 
methodology of metaphysics. a valid argument for a theory always leaves us with 
the choice of accepting the theory or rejecting one or more premises of the argu-
ment. and in the absence of valid arguments we may find ourselves needing to 
choose between theories, each of which has some strong but inconclusive arguments 
in its favour. if such choices rested solely on relations of consistency and support with 
other metaphysical theories, then correctness of choice would become relativized to 
a thinker. to avoid this unwelcome consequence, we need to take seriously the pos-
sibility of evaluating the costs and benefits of a theory independently of one’s other 
metaphysical commitments. and it is exactly such an evaluation of GMr which we 
attempt in this paper.
1. Is metaphysical nihilism true?
in order for the question of whether a genuine modal realist can be a metaphysical 
nihilist to be of any interest, there must be some principled reason for thinking that 
metaphysical nihilism is true. We have suggested that metaphysical nihilism is itself 
well grounded in intuition. some may deny this (e.g. armstrong 1989, p. 24) or choose 
to over-ride the intuition (e.g. lowe 1996; 1998; and 2002). however, even if we grant 
that metaphysical nihilism itself does not express a secure modal intuition, it remains 
that metaphysical nihilism follows from propositions which have the sort of pre-theo-
retic credibility which makes accommodating them a constraint on the credibility of 
any philosophical reasoning.
These propositions have found expression in an argument for metaphysical nihilism 
due to Thomas Baldwin (Baldwin 1996) and refined by Gonzalo rodriguez-pereyra 
(rodriguez-pereyra 1997). Baldwin calls this argument ‘the subtraction argument’, and 
it contains the following three premises:
(a1) There might be a world with a finite domain of ‘concrete’ objects.
(a2) These objects are, each of them, things which might not exist.
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(a3) The non-existence of any one of these things does not necessitate the existence 
of any other such things.
from these premises, Baldwin (Baldwin 1996, p. 232) argues for metaphysical nihilism 
in the following way.
By (a1), starting from the actual world W, there is an accessible world w1 whose 
domain of concrete objects is finite. pick any member x1 of this domain: by (a2) there 
is a world accessible from w1, w2, which is just like w1 except that it lacks x1 and any 
other things whose non-existence is implied by the non-existence of x1. since, by 
(a3), the domain of w2 does not contain things which do not exist in w1, it follows 
that the domain of w2 is smaller than that of w1. This procedure of subtraction can 
then be iterated, until we get to a world wmin whose domain consists of one or more 
concrete objects, such that the non-existence of one implies the non-existence of 
all. By (a2) the non-existence of one of these objects is possible, so there is a world 
wnil just like wmin whose domain lacks all these objects; and since, by (a3), the  
non-existence of these things does not require the existence of anything else, wnil is a 
world in which there is no concrete object at all. if one now allows that accessibility 
between worlds is transitive (the characteristic s4 assumption) it follows that wnil is 
accessible from, or possible relative to, the actual world.
Baldwin’s phrase, ‘this procedure of subtraction’ is undoubtedly meant to be a meta-
phor. if it is taken literally, it suggests a physical operation on a possible world to cre-
ate another possible world by taking away some of the objects in the original possible 
world. Because possible worlds are not the kind of thing one can create by a physical 
operation, such a literal interpretation of ‘this procedure of subtraction’ is thus inadvis-
able and was surely never intended. instead of taking subtraction in such a literalist 
sense, we should understand subtraction in terms of a modal independence property 
of concrete objects, namely that they could have failed to exist without requiring some-
thing else to exist in their place, which can be represented by a relation between the 
objects which exist at different worlds. in this way, we can make sense of subtraction 
worlds, that is, worlds whose domains stand in a certain relation to each other, a rela-
tion suggested by Baldwin’s subtraction metaphor.
With this understanding of the reasoning behind the subtraction argument in hand, we 
can isolate the intuitions driving the subtraction argument, which are:
(1) There could be a finite number of concrete objects.
(2) if there are some concrete objects, there could have been fewer of those concrete 
objects (and no other concrete objects).
We take it that these intuitions are commonly held, and they are pre-theoretically plau-
sible. now since (2) is a priori, it is necessary.6 so we have:
6  There are, of course, exceptions to the rule that a priori truths are necessary, but (2) does not appear to be one. 
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(3) necessarily, if there are some concrete objects, there could have been fewer of 
those concrete objects (and no other concrete objects).
There are a finite number of concrete objects at a world if, for some natural number 
n, there is at least 1 and at most n concrete objects. Without loss of generality, let n=2. 
We can then formalise (1) and (3) in the following way so that they entail metaphysical 
nihilism:
(a1) ∃w∃x∃y((E!xw ∧ E!yw) ∧ ∀z(E!zw ⊃ (z = x ∨ z = y)))
(B) ∀w1∀x(E!xw1 ⊃ ∃w2(E!xw2 ∧ ∀y(E!yw2 ⊂ E!yw1)))
(Mn) ∃w∀x¬E!xw.
where ‘E!’ is the existence at a world predicate defined by reference to the domain of a 
world (∀xE!xw iff x ∈ dom(w)) and object quantifiers are unrestricted, with restriction 
to the domain of a world being achieved by using E!.7 This argument, we maintain, 
constitutes a persuasive case for metaphysical nihilism.8 But according to GMr worlds 
are not containers in which objects exist, but just mereological sums of those of objects. 
if the empty world is not an empty container but a collection of objects, in which ob-
jects could it consist? so, it is a pressing issue for the genuine modal realist whether her 
theory is consistent with metaphysical nihilism.
2. Methodological constraints on modal metaphysics
But even if the genuine modal realist remains unpersuaded by the argument, it appears 
that her theory should not exclude metaphysical nihilism, for methodological reasons. 
There are two methodological principles that constrain metaphysical theories. They 
can be called ‘ockham’s razor’ and ‘hume’s razor’:9 
(or) Do not multiply kinds of entities beyond necessity.
(hr) Do not multiply necessities beyond necessity.10 
Beyond ‘necessity’ here means: more than is required in order to construct an adequate 
theory. The razors are instruments of theory choice, so if there is only one adequate 
of these exceptions.
7  all modal claims in this paper can be formulated in QMl with box and diamond, but the quantification over 
worlds notation is more perspicuous.
8  We have defended the soundness of this argument elsewhere, Efird & stoneham 2005.
9  There is a third, which we might call ‘Quine’s razor’ after Quine 1951:
(Qr) Do not complicate theory beyond necessity.
This razor cuts when we try to preserve an ontology in the face of recalcitrant experience by complicating the 
theory of how those items behave.  it is arguable that (hr) is merely a special case of (Qr).
10  if our modal logic is s5, this will have to be restricted to the necessitations of non-modal claims, because in s5 
p entails that it is necessarily possible that p.
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theory, they have no role. if (hr) is indeed a constraint on philosophical theorising, 
then it seems that there is a presumption in favour of metaphysical nihilism, which 
asserts the possibility of there being nothing concrete.11 so by (hr) a theory should ex-
clude metaphysical nihilism only if it must, and if it must, this counts as a relative cost 
to accepting the theory. Does GMr incur this cost? We argue that it need not below.
But before proceeding to that argument, it is necessary to reflect on the trumping re-
lationship between the two razors, for it is likely that they will come into conflict in 
theory construction and evaluation. That is, if a theory must violate either of the two 
razors, which razor should the theorist choose to violate? Despite russell’s assertion 
that ‘i should regard [ockam’s razor] as the supreme methodological maxim in phi-
losophizing’ (russell 1914, p. 145), there may be no general answer to this question. But 
an answer specific to GMr is fairly clear. We noted in the opening paragraph that GMr 
generates a constraint on what is possible: by saying what possible worlds are, GMr 
limits what possible worlds there are and thus what possibilities there are. But given 
this constraint, GMr is maximally permissible: it is possible that p iff there is a possible 
world at which p is true, and every possible world which ‘might’ exist does exist. The 
analysis of possibility in terms of the existence of worlds leaves no sense in which the 
non-existence of a world could be contingent. put metaphorically, for any proposition 
p, if God was able to create a maximally spatiotemporally interrelated mereological 
sum of things of which p is true, then he did. of its nature, GMr violates (or) and re-
spects (hr); as Melia (Melia 1992) observes, GMr violates (or) to as great an extent as 
any consistent theory could since for every kind that could be (unicorns, dragons, etc.) 
there is a possible world in which that kind exists.12 furthermore, since GMr is a re-
ductive analysis of modality, it is committed to the claim that there are no brute modal 
facts, whereas of course there are brute existential facts — which creates an asymmetry 
between violations of (hr) and of (or), namely, that the former always need further 
explanation but the latter are sometimes brute. These give us good reasons for thinking 
that a genuine modal realist should favour limited violations of (or) over violations of 
(hr). if we make clear that (hr) is restricted to the necessitation of non-modal truths, 
then it seems that in general a violation of (or) will be preferable to the genuine modal 
realist than a violation of (hr).13 With this methodological constraint in place we can 
proceed to argue that the genuine modal realist should be a metaphysical nihilist.
11  someone who is denying metaphysical nihilism is making the strong modal claim that necessarily some con-
crete objects exist, which is why the issue of metaphysical nihilism has a bearing on the traditional metaphysical 
question of why there is something rather than nothing.  Denying metaphysical nihilism gives a trivial answer to 
that question.
12  The theory of unactualized possibilities which did the converse and maximized (hr) violations while minimiz-
ing (or) violations would be an error theory which held that p is possible iff p is actual, for then every falsehood 
would be necessarily false.
13  Which is not to say that (or) costs are free, nor that they cannot be decisive.  one case in which they are obvi-
ously decisive is in the choice between theories which incur no (hr) costs, such as normal scientific theories.
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3. Lewis’s argument that there must have been something
lewis, the architect of GMr, argues from this theory against the possibility of there 
being nothing at all. he writes:
if a world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated 
things, that makes no provision for an absolutely empty world. a world is 
not like a bottle that might hold no beer. The world is the totality of things 
it contains, so even if there’s no beer, there’s still the bottle. and if there isn’t 
even the bottle, there’s nothing there at all. and nothing isn’t a very minimal 
something. Minimal worlds there can indeed be. There can be nothing much: 
just some homogenous unoccupied spacetime, or maybe only one single point 
of it. But nothing much is still something, and there isn’t any world where there’s 
nothing at all. That makes it necessary that there is something. for it’s true at all 
worlds that there is something: it’s true whenever we restrict our quantifiers to 
the domain of parts of a single world, even if the only part of some world is one 
indivisible nondescript point. of course, if we don’t restrict quantifiers from 
the standpoint of one world or another, then all the more is it true that there is 
something rather than nothing: there is logical space, the totality of the worlds 
in all their glory. (lewis 1986b, p. 73)
There are two questions to consider here: does the conclusion of lewis’s argument con-
flict with metaphysical nihilism and, if so, is lewis’s argument persuasive? in what fol-
lows we consider two lines of thought. argument a maintains that lewis’s reasoning is 
sound but that his conclusion does not in fact conflict with metaphysical nihilism, for it 
merely rules out the null world of no spatiotemporal objects, not the empty world of no 
concrete objects. We show that this line of thought incurs substantial (hr) costs. argu-
ment B maintains that lewis’s argument is unsound, assuming he intends the objectual 
quantifiers only to range over spatiotemporal objects. according to argument B, there 
is a world which contains no concrete objects and no spatiotemporal objects, which 
is also a mereological sum, the only part of which is also a part of other worlds. This 
object is the null individual, something which only contingently has a spatiotemporal 
location. positing the null individual is an (or) cost.
4. There must have been something but there might have been nothing 
concrete
The genuine modal realist who thinks that lewis’s argument is sound may try to take 
the bite out of the required violation of (hr) by arguing that her theory is consistent 
with metaphysical nihilism; this genuine modal realist then concludes that the viola-
tion of (hr) required by her theory is not as costly as it appears to be. This theorist 
argues as follows, which we shall call ‘argument a’.
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We must distinguish carefully the claim that there must have been something 
from the claim that there must have been something concrete; correlatively we 
must distinguish the (hr) cost entailed by a theory that includes the former claim 
from the (hr) cost entailed by a theory that includes the latter claim. intuition 
strongly tells against the latter claim, but having distinguished the two claims, it 
is not at all clear that intuition supports strongly the former claim. so if GMr 
includes the former but not the latter claim, it avoids the (hr) cost of denying 
metaphysical nihilism. 
While initially attractive, this argument fails to consider the other (hr) costs involved 
in claiming that there must have been something though there need not have been 
anything concrete. in order to evaluate these consequences, we must be explicit about 
what counts as a concrete object. 
‘concrete’ is a term of art variously used to specify different, but overlapping sets of ob-
jects in different philosophical contexts, e.g. spatiotemporal objects, causally efficacious 
objects, middle-sized dry goods. for present purposes, we take a concrete object to be 
one that satisfies the following severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions:
(a) it exists at a location in spacetime, 
(b) it has some intrinsic quality, and
(c) it has a natural boundary.14 
abstract objects then are ones that are not concrete. Metaphysical nihilism maintains 
that there might have been no concrete objects, so understood.
Given this understanding of metaphysical nihilism, it seems clear that GMr, in and of 
itself, is not in conflict with the view: GMr is consistent with there being worlds con-
sisting of only spatiotemporal points, which we may call ‘stp worlds’. an stp world is 
a GMr-possible world because it is a maximal sum of spatiotemporally related things. 
But an stp world is also an empty world by the lights of metaphysical nihilism: since 
spacetime points have no intrinsic qualities, they are abstract by the above characteri-
sation of the abstract/concrete distinction.15 so the genuine modal realist who takes it 
that there must have been something can accept metaphysical nihilism by maintaining 
that the smallest worlds consist of spacetime points. consequently, the following posi-
tions are consistent:
(i) GMr, which (we are assuming) entails that there must have been something, 
(ii) spacetime points, despite being abstract, count as things,
(iii) metaphysical nihilism
14  for a defence of this characterisation of concrete objects in connection with the subtraction argument see Efird 
& stoneham 2005, pp. 310-6
15  rodriguez-pereyra 1997, p. 165, notes that spacetime points are also abstract by his refinement of Baldwin’s 
characterisation of the abstract/concrete distinction.
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But maintaining (i), (ii) and (iii) comes at a certain price, a price which may be paid in 
a variety of ways, depending on how many spacetime points the smallest worlds must 
contain. We shall abbreviate the family of theories that result from the conjunction of 
(i), (ii) and (iii) as ‘GMr+stp’.
suppose the genuine modal realist maintains (i), (ii) and (iii) by claiming that 
(iv) the smallest worlds consist of a single point of spacetime. 
if only one spacetime point exists it must have a location, since location in space and 
time is an essential property of a spacetime point. This location cannot be determined 
by its spatiotemporal relations to other things, since there are none, and so must be de-
termined by reference to absolute, newtonian spacetime. so (iv) commits our theorist 
to either:
(v) necessarily spacetime is absolute, or
(vi) necessarily, if there are no concrete objects, spacetime is absolute.
argument a held that the consistency of (i) – (iv) provided a means for the genuine 
modal realist to avoid the (hr) cost of denying metaphysical nihilism. But (iv) entails (v) 
or (vi), thus incurring an (hr) cost at least as large as denying metaphysical nihilism. so, 
argument a looks entirely unpersuasive in relation to the theory that results from con-
joining (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). consequently, (iv) should find no home in GMr.
in light of this argument against (iv), the genuine modal realist who accepts (i), (ii) and 
(iii) may claim that:
(vii) the smallest worlds consist of at least two spacetime points.
This would not then require either (v) or (vi). But if spacetime is necessarily dense, and 
each of the smallest worlds contain more than one spacetime point, each such world 
contains an infinite number of them. so, by taking the smallest worlds to consist of 
more than one spacetime point, this genuine modal realist must maintain that either:
(viii) spacetime is necessarily discrete,
(ix) there is a necessary connection between there being only spacetime points and 
spacetime being discrete, or
(x) there must have been an infinite number of things (where spacetime points 
count as things).
now maintaining any of these three claims entails a substantial (hr) cost, so argument 
(a) again looks unpersuasive in relation to the theory that results from conjoining (i), 
(ii), (iii) and (vii). 
since (iv) and (vii) appear to exhaust the ways in which (i), (ii) and (iii) are consistent, 
and since both theories which result from including (iv) or including (vii) are unat-
tractive for methodological reasons, it seems desperate to maintain (i), (ii) and (iii). 
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furthermore, it is epistemically possible, even plausible, that the nature of spacetime is 
an empirical matter, and this makes the (hr) costs of accepting GMr+stp especially 
high. so, it seems that the genuine modal realist who maintains (ii) and (iii) ought to 
resist lewis’s argument. That is, such a genuine modal realist should take her theory 
not to exclude the null world of no spatiotemporally located things. consequently, the 
genuine modal realist needs to show where lewis’s argument goes wrong, and then give 
an account of the null world consistent with her theory.
5. An account of the null world consistent with GMR
lewis’s argument against the null world seems to come down to this: 
a world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated objects. 
Therefore, a world is a mereological sum of spatiotemporally located objects. 
By definition, the null world contains no spatiotemporally located objects. The 
mereological sum of no parts does not exist. so the null world does not exist.
however, formal mereology allows one to define the null individual, which is the result of 
taking an object away from itself, and is, correlatively, a part of every object. if the null world 
consists of the null individual alone, it would be a mereological sum. But would it be a pos-
sible world according to GMr? That is, would it be a mereological sum of spatiotemporally 
located objects? to answer this question, we shall consider the following argument.
some care is needed here, because at the null world the null individual has no 
spatiotemporal location. however, since it is part of every mereological sum, it 
is part of every world, and thus is a part of many maximal mereological sums of 
spatiotemporally interrelated objects. in fact, it even has spatial locations at non-
null worlds. The question is whether the sum of the null individual and nothing 
else is itself a possible world. of course, the proponent of GMr could deny this, but 
there is one good reason to accept it. The null individual is a part of every world, so 
we can apply the principle of recombination ‘according to which patching together 
parts of possible worlds yields another possible world’ (lewis 1986b, p. 87) to 
show that there is a possible world consisting of the null individual alone. The null 
individual is not a concrete object, by the definition given above, therefore this is 
an empty world and GMr is consistent with metaphysical nihilism. 
call this ‘argument B’. 16
to assess argument B we need to know more about the null individual. in formal 
mereology, the null individual is defined as the intersection of two sums which have 
no parts in common, sometimes expressed as ‘that which remains when an object is 
16  Thinking back to Baldwin’s subtraction metaphor, that the null world consists of the null individual is just what 
one would expect since it is surely possible that there is a single concrete object which has the property of subtrac-
tability, and the null individual is that which remains when an object is subtracted from itself.
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subtracted from itself ’. This is analogous to the definition of zero in number theory. 
More intuitively, it is a part of every object, and this relational property is essential to 
it. like spacetime points, the null individual lacks any intrinsic properties.17 since the 
null individual has no intrinsic properties, it is abstract, and since it is a part of every 
object, every concrete object has an abstract part. and if every concrete object is ‘sub-
tractable’ in the sense specified in the subtraction argument, it does not follow that all 
of its parts are ‘subtractable’, specifically, the part that is the null individual may not 
be ‘subtractable’. if the empty world required by metaphysical nihilism consists of the 
null individual, then in ‘subtracting’ a concrete object from a world in which it is the 
only concrete object, one does not subtract all of its parts – only its concrete parts are 
subtracted. This would entail that the null individual is an abstract, necessary existent. 
furthermore, if there is more than one object, the null individual is a part of each, and 
is thus, like an immanent universal, multiply located.
The null individual also has accidental properties, which either (i) have the form: being 
a part of such-and-such object, or (ii) derive from the properties and relations of the 
objects of which it is a part. suppose a world consist of two objects, a and b, which are 3 
metres apart. in that world the null object has the following accidental properties: it is a 
part of a, it is a part of b, (given a ≠ b) it is a part of two objects, it has two occurrences, 
it has an occurrence 3 metres from a, it has an occurrence 3 metres from b, it has two 
occurrences 3 metres apart, etc. These accidental properties are obviously extrinsic, so 
all of the null individual’s accidental properties are also extrinsic.
now it might be thought that an individual with these characteristics is simply too 
weird to be intelligible. This is lewis’s view. he argues that the null individual does not 
exist on the basis (i) that there is no good reason for supposing that it does exist, and 
(ii) that if it does, it gives rise to unpalatable consequences. These unpalatable conse-
quences include: that the mereological sum of the null individual and something else 
is simply the something else, that everything has a common part with everything else, 
and that there is an individual that has no proper parts. lewis writes:
But it is well-nigh unintelligible how anything could behave as the null individual 
is said to behave. it is a very queer thing indeed, and we have no good reason 
to believe in it. such streamlining as it offers in mereology – namely, that 
intersections of things come out well-defined even when they shouldn’t – can 
well be done without. Therefore, reject the null individual; look elsewhere for the 
null set (lewis 1991, p. 11).
as lewis notes, there are theoretical advantages for postulating the existence of the null 
individual for mereology. specifically, if such an individual exists, then mereology is a 
17  someone might try to argue that the relational property of being a part of every object is in fact intrinsic because 
it is two-way independent of loneliness (as long as it is allowed that lonely objects can have parts), which is the 
langton & lewis 1998 definition of intrinsicness.  however, this consequence is best seen as a counterexample to 
the langton-lewis definition (e.g. hawthorne 2001).
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complete Boolean algebra. Thus, one might accept the existence of the null individual 
on grounds of formal simplicity. But an argument based solely on formal consider-
ations would hardly be persuasive. 
a better argument aimed specifically at the genuine modal realist might be this:
The question of whether or not the null individual exists is not settled by GMr 
alone. so the genuine modal realist could adopt the existence of the null individual, 
which is sufficient to give a GMr-acceptable account of the null world and avoid 
the (hr) cost of denying metaphysical nihilism. in this way, the genuine modal 
realist can accommodate metaphysical nihilism and the intuitions backing the 
subtraction argument. so, the genuine modal realist should accept the existence 
of the null individual.
But can GMr really accommodate the null individual? Doubts might be raised on the 
basis of the following argument: 
possible worlds are maximally spatiotemporally interrelated mereological sums 
of things. possible worlds do not overlap each other, i.e. possible worlds have 
no part in common. if there is a null individual, it is by definition part of every 
world. so, there is no null individual.
That possible worlds do not overlap is an addition to the set of claims characterising 
GMr that we have thus far considered, but it is one that lewis (lewis 1986b, pp. 198-
209) has argued is essential to GMr. he argues that it is a formal feature of GMr that 
prohibits worlds from sharing parts in common. if this argument is sound, then it seems 
that GMr must deny the existence of the null individual. and so we would have a case 
of the first aspect of modal theorizing, namely, a theory of the nature of (un)actualized 
possibilities, constraining the theorist’s overall ontology, namely, in excluding the null 
individual from her ontology. We would also have a case of this first aspect constrain-
ing the second aspect, which is the theory of what kinds of possibilities there are, for if 
the theorist’s overall ontology excludes the null individual, then it does not exist in any 
possible world, and so could not exist. But it would be too quick, we think, to rule out 
the existence of the null individual on the basis of this argument since the reasoning 
behind lewis’s prohibition against overlap allows for two exceptions.
The first case of acceptable overlap is when two worlds share a common part that has 
no accidental intrinsic properties. to appreciate this case, we must first examine lewis’s 
argument against overlap. lewis writes:
My main problem is not with the overlap itself. Things do have shared parts 
in common, as in the case of the siamese twins’ hand. Given the unrestricted 
mereology i favour, sharing of parts is altogether commonplace. indeed, any 
part of any world is part of countless mereological sums that extend beyond that 
world. But what i do find problematic – inconsistent, not to mince words – is the 
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way the common part of the two worlds is supposed to have different properties 
in the one world and in the other. (lewis 1986b, p. 199)
This inconsistency, lewis argues, arises in some cases of overlap, such as a case in which 
humphrey is a part of two different worlds but has a different number of fingers in each 
world:
so humphrey, who is part of this world and here has five fingers on the left hand, 
is also part of some other world and there has six fingers on his left hand. Qua 
part of this world he has five fingers, qua part of that world he has six. he himself 
– one and the same and altogether self-identical – has five fingers on the left 
hand, and he has not five but six. how can this be? you might as well say that 
the shared hand of the siamese twins has five fingers as ted’s left hand, but it has 
six fingers as ned’s right hand! That is double-talk and contradiction. here is the 
hand. never mind what else it is part of. how many fingers does it have? (lewis 
1986b, pp. 199-200)
The problem lewis here raises about overlap turns upon the overlapping objects having 
accidental intrinsic properties and thus would not apply to objects which either had no 
intrinsic properties or had all their intrinsic properties essentially. since the null indi-
vidual has no intrinsic properties, the argument, as stated, does not pose a problem for 
the inclusion of the null individual in GMr. 
however, the argument can be transposed to accidental pure extrinsic properties, that 
is properties which hold independently of the intrinsic properties of any objects (see 
lewis 2001b, p. 384), such as being 200 miles from london. suppose two objects, Bill 
and Ben, both existed at w1 and at w2. at w1, Bill is no more than 3 metres away from 
Ben and at w2 Bill is at least 5 metres away from Ben. so now we can ask lewis’s ques-
tion: here are two objects, Bill and Ben, how far apart are they? again, the answer ap-
pears to be ‘double-talk and contradiction’.
as we noted above, the null individual certainly has accidental pure extrinsic properties, 
so this version of lewis’s argument would apply. however, allowing the null individual to 
exist at more than one world does not generate any more contradiction and double-talk 
than allowing it to exist at just one world. for it is part of Bill and part of Ben and also part 
of claire, who, in w1, is at least 5 metres from Bill. so in w1, the null individual is multiply 
located and thus both at most 3 and at least 5 metres away from Bill. if we can accept mul-
tiply located items within a world, then the problem of accidental pure extrinsics does not 
arise. This suggests that the null individual is an example of the second case of acceptable 
overlap, namely the trivial overlap of immanent universals. 
in the initial section of the first chapter of On the Plurality of Worlds, namely, ‘The 
Thesis of plurality of Worlds’, and in the paragraph where lewis defines ‘modal real-
ism’, when he should have been most careful about exactly what GMr involves, lewis 
characterises worlds in the following way:
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They are isolated: there are no spatiotemporal relations at all between things that 
belong to different worlds. nor does anything that happens at one world cause 
anything to happen at another. nor do they overlap; they have no parts in common, 
with the exception, perhaps, of immanent universals exercising their characteristic 
privilege of repeated occurrence. (lewis 1986b, p. 2; emphasis added) 
 in what should have been his most carefully considered statement of GMr, lewis al-
lows that worlds can overlap, in what might be regarded as a trivial manner: if there 
are immanent universals, then they are trivially part of many worlds in virtue of having 
instances at those worlds. in previous work, lewis (lewis 1983) gives reasons for add-
ing universals to his ontology, so combining modal realism with a theory of universals 
must have been a live possibility for him. he later (lewis 1986a) rejects universals, but 
this rejection should not be taken to imply that GMr cannot accommodate universals, 
since the genuine modal realist can allow for a trivial overlapping of worlds. in his 
(lewis 2001a, p. 604), lewis reiterates that the genuine modal realist can admit univer-
sals into her ontology, and clarifies his claim that worlds do not overlap as the prohibi-
tion against worlds having particular parts in common. now is the null individual a 
particular or a universal? in many ways it seems to be a particular, since its relation to 
other particulars is the part-whole relation not the instantiation relation, which is why 
it is called the ‘null individual’, but it also shares with immanent universals the proper-
ties of being intuitively abstract, multiply located and trivially part of more than one 
world. This seems to be a case where the particular/universal distinction is not sharp 
enough to do independent philosophical work. in any case, even if the null individual’s 
being trivially part of every world is not seen to be analogous to immanent universals 
being trivially part of multiple worlds, the null individual’s being part of every world 
presents no difficulty for the genuine modal realist since it has no intrinsic properties, 
and its accidental extrinsic properties do not vary across worlds in ways that they can-
not also vary within a world, as discussed above. Thus, there is no argument against the 
null individual even from the augmented characterisation of GMr considered here, 
and argument B serves to show that GMr can avoid the (hr) cost of denying meta-
physical nihilism.
if the genuine modal realist accepts this account of the null world, as a world consisting 
of the null individual, a theory which we shall abbreviate as ‘GMr+ni’ then a certain 
consequence concerning the nature of possible worlds follows. to begin, just as the null 
individual is abstract, so is the null world: it consists of nothing but the null individual 
which lacks any intrinsic properties, so the null world lacks any intrinsic properties; 
hence it too is abstract. furthermore, if all worlds are of the same ontological type, 
then all worlds are abstract. This ruling goes against the received view that on GMr 
all worlds are concrete. But lewis (lewis 1986b, p. 81) himself is ‘reluctant’ to endorse 
the argument that if all worlds are of the same ontological type and the actual world 
is concrete, then all worlds are concrete, because it is not clear to him ‘what philoso-
phers mean when they speak of “concrete” and “abstract” in this connection’. Given 
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the conception of the abstract/concrete distinction that we have been using, we should 
not be surprised to find that it is a little unclear whether possible worlds are abstract 
or concrete. for do they have spatial locations? all their parts do, but there does not 
seem to be any sense to be made of the claim that the possible world itself has a loca-
tion in space and time, as opposed to an extent and a duration. But if we want to save 
the intuition that the actual world is concrete, not abstract, we can define a notion of 
concreteness called ‘concrete*’ whereby something is concrete* iff either it is concrete 
or it has concrete parts. Then we could say that no worlds are concrete, but some, in fact 
the overwhelming majority, are concrete*. We should note that exactly the same issues 
will arise with GMr+stp.
6. A third way?
at this point someone might wonder what all the fuss is about. Both GMr+stp and 
GMr+ni make GMr consistent with metaphysical nihilism by allowing a world which 
is composed entirely of abstract objects, in one case spacetime points and in the other 
the null individual. But if metaphysical nihilism only requires there to be no concrete 
objects, why not say that the empty world is composed of such common-or-garden 
abstract objects as numbers and pure sets? in particular, if GMr+ni is acceptable, then 
worlds can be composed of abstract objects with no spatiotemporal location, so the 
obvious reason to exclude a world consisting solely of numbers and sets will not do.
But there is an important difference. The numbers and sets which might populate the 
empty world are not part of the mereological sums which, according to GMr, are the 
actual world and the other non-empty possible worlds. Everything which is ‘part of our 
world’ must ‘exist at some distance and direction from here, or at some time before or 
after or simultaneous with now’ (lewis 1986b, p. 1). numbers and abstract sets fail to 
meet this condition and thus fail to be part of this world. so we cannot use the principle 
of recombination to argue that a mereological sum of numbers and sets is a possible 
world. in contrast, both spacetime points and the null individual are part of this world, 
and thus sums consisting of just those things count as worlds. Thus there is no GMr-
possible world consisting of just numbers and sets, but there are GMr-possible worlds 
consisting of just the equally abstract spacetime points or null individual.
7. The time to choose
having outlined GMr+stp and GMr+ni we can see that GMr is consistent with 
metaphysical nihilism and with its denial. since we think there is a good reason to ac-
cept metaphysical nihilism, we think the genuine modal realist should choose between 
these two extensions of his theory. The correct method here is to weigh the costs of 
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each theory. to begin, they both agree that the empty world is not absolutely empty, it 
contains an abstract object: on GMr+stp, the null world contains spacetime point(s), 
and on GMr+ni it contains the null individual. here is where the agreement ends. as 
outlined above GMr+stp entails two (hr) costs: that there necessarily exist spacetime 
points and either that spacetime is necessarily absolute or necessarily dense (or the 
weaker, conditional versions of these claims). GMr+ni entails an (or) cost, because 
it postulates the null individual which is not required by GMr+stp, and an (hr) cost, 
because the null individual is a necessary existent. We argued above that, for a genu-
ine modal realist, (hr) trumps (or), so it would seem that there are methodological 
reasons to prefer GMr+ni. furthermore, as noted above, the fact that there is an epis-
temic possibility that the questions of the absoluteness and density of spacetime are 
empirical makes the (hr) costs of GMr+stp rather high. in contrast, it is fairly clear 
that the existence of the null individual is an a priori matter. of course, if one had inde-
pendent reasons to believe in necessarily absolute or dense spacetime, then one would 
have already paid the costs of GMr+stp. Equally, if one had independent reasons to 
believe in the null individual, one would have paid the costs of GMr+ni. But consid-
ered entirely on their own merits, GMr+ni is the better theory. 18
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